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COMPANION ANIMALS ARE MORE THAN 
“JUST” PERSONAL PROPERTY: OREGON 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
Several states have joined a growing trend of changing the 
traditional legal view of animals, specifically domestic pets, from 
“mere property”1 to “living beings”2 because they “occupy a unique 
position in people’s hearts and in the law.”3 
On June 16, 2016, the Oregon Supreme Court held in State v. 
Newcomb4 that where a dog is lawfully seized based on probable cause 
of neglect, the owner does not have a protected privacy interest in the 
pet’s blood under either the Oregon Constitution or the United States 
Constitution.5 Despite having strong opinions on the matter, the court 
narrowed its holding to circumstances where the animal had not only 
been lawfully seized by the State based on probable cause of either 
neglect or abuse, but also confined it to the performance of “medically 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, December 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Business and 
Organizational Communication: Public Relations, 2009, The University of Akron. This Comment 
would not have been possible without the support and guidance from Professor Sande Buhai, whose 
passion in this area of law was simply inspiring. Many thanks to Professor Kelley Mauerman, my 
former professor of Lawyering Skills at Whittier Law School, who fostered my love of writing and 
gave me the technical skills necessary to write this Comment. I would like to thank the editors and 
staff at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their efforts and contributions, with special 
thanks to Note & Comment Editor Michelle Cornell-Davis. I dedicate this piece to my parents, who 
always encouraged me to follow my dreams, and of course, to my dog Bandit who inspired my 
interest in the area of Animal Law. 
 1. See OR. REV. STAT. § 609.020 (2009). 
 2. State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434, 439 (Or. 2016). 
 3. State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278, 284 (Or. 2014). 
 4. 375 P.3d 434 (Or. 2016). 
 5. Id. at 436. 
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appropriate procedure[s] for diagnosis and treatment of animals in ill-
health.”6 
The decision draws a line between constitutional protections for 
different types of personal property, stating that, “not all things that 
can be owned and possessed as personal property merit the same 
constitutional protection.”7 For instance, a person may not treat his or 
her dog the same way a person treats his or her suitcase.8 Oregon 
statutes require “minimum care”9 of domestic pets, and if these 
obligations are not met, an “owner has no cognizable right, in the name 
of [] privacy, to countermand that obligation.”10 With these ideas in 
mind, the court recognized the position of animals in the law as above 
that of “inanimate property.”11 
As this Comment will address, the decision is consistent with 
previous Oregon cases as well as recent decisions in select other states, 
all of which are joining the trend toward more protection for animals.12 
Part II discusses the factual and procedural history of Newcomb. Part 
III looks at the reasoning of the court and its conclusion. Part IV builds 
the historical framework, and finally, Part V ties together the historical 
framework and examines a small sample of states that are also making 
legislative and judicial decisions that support the social norms and 
growing trends described by the Newcomb court. 
 
 6. Id. at 444. 
 7. Id. at 440. 
 8. See generally id. at 440 (discussing the existing Oregon precedent regarding searches of 
containers and insentient beings); cf. id. at 440–41(distinguishing sentient beings from the objects 
discussed in State v. Owens, 729 P.2d 524 (1986)). 
 9. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 167.310(9) (2017). 
 10. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 443 (emphasis omitted). 
 11. Id. at 441. 
 12. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(5) (2017) (guiding court decisions in divorce cases by 
basing custody on the best interests of the animal); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.305(2); State v. 
Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278, 286 (Or. 2014); cf. Christopher Sean Krimmer, Following 
Alaska’s Lead: A Wisconsin Pet Custody Statute, WIS. LAW. (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=90&Is
sue=4&ArticleID=25533 (suggesting a Wisconsin pet custody statute closely modeled on Alaska’s 
law); California Court of Appeals Says Pets Are More than Inanimate Property, ALL-
CREATURES.ORG (Oct. 2012), https://www.all-creatures.org/articles/ar-california-court.html 
(discussing the California Second District Court of Appeals ruling that allows for reasonable 
recovery of necessary costs for wrongfully injured animals); “Goddard’s Law” Passes Ohio 
House, OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (June 25, 2015), http://www.ohiohouse.gov/stephen-
d-hambley/press/goddards-law-passes-ohio-house (discussing now-enacted “Goddard’s Law,” 
which elevates penalties for animal abuse to felonies). 
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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Special Agent Austin Wallace (“Wallace”) was an animal cruelty 
investigator and certified police officer when he received a citizen’s 
report that the defendant, Amanda Newcomb (“Newcomb”), was 
neglecting her dog, Juno.13 Newcomb was twenty-eight years old at 
the time and was self-employed, ironically enough, as a dog sitter.14 
The report provided that Newcomb allegedly locked Juno in a kennel 
for long periods of time, starved him, and beat him.15 Based on this 
report, Wallace went to Newcomb’s home to speak with her.16 During 
the conversation, Juno remained outside, but visible to the officer 
through a sliding glass door.17 Wallace observed Juno, in a “near-
emaciated condition,” attempting to eat items in the yard and dry 
heaving, all with no visible fat on his body.18 In his experience, 
Wallace had observed hundreds of animals in similar conditions, and 
asked Newcomb why Juno was so thin.19 Newcomb admitted to 
Wallace she had “run out” of Juno’s food, and stated she “was 
planning on buying food that evening.”20 
Based on all the circumstances and factors such as his visual 
observations, the citizen’s report, and Newcomb’s statements during 
questioning, Wallace determined he had probable cause of 
Newcomb’s neglect.21 Wallace offered to take Juno for medical 
treatment but Newcomb declined the assistance, stating that her dog 
“looked healthy.”22 Wallace felt it was likely Juno needed medical 
attention and therefore took Juno, over Newcomb’s objections, to Dr. 
Zarah Hedge of the Oregon Humane Society.23 
 
 13. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 436. 
 14. See Merritt Clifton, Stepping in Poop Without a Warrant: Oregon Supreme Court Rules, 
ANIMALS 24-7 (June 21, 2016), https://www.animals24-7.org/2016/06/21/stepping-in-poop-
without-a-warrant-oregon-supreme-court-rules/; see Aimee Green, Pets Not ‘Mere’ Property: 
Oregon Supreme Court Upholds Dog-Starvation Conviction, OREGONLIVE (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2016/06/pets_arent_just_property_orego.html. 
 15. See Green, supra note 14. 
 16. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 436. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 436; see also SAUNDERS COMPREHENSIVE VETERINARY DICTIONARY 365 (Virginia 
P Studdert et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012) (defining “emaciation” as “excessive leanness; a wasted 
condition of the body; generally taken to mean that the body weight is less than 50 percent of the 
normal expected for a comparable normal animal.”). 
 19. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 436–37; Green, supra note 14. 
 20. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 437. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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Dr. Hedge examined Juno and using a body condition score test,24 
placed Juno at a 1.5.25 Veterinarians base this decision on various 
factors, such as “whether the dog’s ribs and spine are visibly 
protruding (meaning that the dog is emaciated); or, on the opposite 
end of the scale, whether the veterinarian must actually touch the dog 
to be able to locate its ribs and spine (meaning that the dog is obese).”26 
In order to rule out any internal conditions or reasons that could 
have caused Juno’s malnourished state, Dr. Hedge drew a blood 
sample for testing.27 Because the tests revealed no parasites nor any 
other medical conditions, Dr. Hedge determined Juno’s condition was 
a result of neglect and malnourishment.28 Given this information, 
Newcomb received a citation for second-degree animal neglect, a 
Class B Misdemeanor.29 
Before the case proceeded to trial, Newcomb argued a motion to 
suppress the blood test results based on several different arguments.30 
First, Newcomb argued Wallace did not have probable cause of 
neglect to take Juno for treatment, making the seizure unlawful.31 
Second, she argued the blood draw performed by Dr. Hedge 
constituted an unreasonable and warrantless search of her personal 
property.32 In so doing, she analogized Juno to other tangible personal 
property such as folders, stereos, vehicles, or boots.33 Newcomb urged 
the court that even if it found Wallace had lawfully seized Juno, the 
State could only examine the outside of the dog without a warrant.34 
Relying in part on the “knowingly exposed” doctrine of the Fourth 
 
 24. See generally Kimberly Baldwin et al., Nutritional Assessment Guidelines for Dogs and 
Cats, 46 J. AM. ANIMAL HOSP. ASS’N 285, 287 (2010) (explaining the body condition score test). 
 25. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 437. When veterinarians use the body condition score test, they are 
looking for the ideal, healthy body condition score of a dog, which is a four to five. The scale ranges 
“from one—meaning emaciated—to nine—meaning obese.” Id. 
 26. Id.; see generally Body Condition Scoring (BCS) Systems, J. AM. ANIMAL HOSP. ASS’N 
(2010), https://www.aaha.org/globalassets/02-guidelines/weight-management/weightmgmt_ 
bodyconditionscoring.pdf (providing a graphical representation of body condition scoring 
systems). 
 27. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 437. 
 28. Id. 
 29. OR. REV. STAT. § 167.325(2) (2017) (providing that a person is guilty under this statute 
where the requisite mental state is present and where an animal is in their possession or control and 
they neglect an animal by failing to provide minimum care, or by tethering the animal, causing 
physical injury); Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 437. 
 30. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 437. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 437–38. 
 34. Id. at 438. 
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Amendment analysis, she argued the interior of Juno was her personal 
property that she did not intend to display to the public, which she kept 
from public view, making it private.35 
In opposition, the prosecution argued Wallace had probable cause 
regarding neglect, making his seizure of the dog for medical treatment 
lawful and reasonable.36 While the prosecution conceded that a dog is 
personal property under current Oregon law, they argued Juno could 
not be analogized to an “opaque container” in regards to privacy 
interests because dogs only typically contain “more dog.”37 Therefore, 
the drawing of blood could not have revealed anything that Newcomb 
could expect to be kept as private.38 
Interestingly, Dr. Hedge was not asked to testify at the 
suppression hearing.39 Instead, the parties stipulated that the tests and 
results of the tests indicated Juno’s malnourishment.40 The court 
denied Newcomb’s arguments and motion to suppress, concluding 
that the seizure of Juno by the officer was based on probable cause and 
therefore lawful.41 Thus, no warrant was required in order to 
“medically test Juno’s blood.”42 
At trial, Newcomb was convicted of the second-degree animal 
neglect charge, which she subsequently appealed.43 Both parties 
asserted similar arguments on appeal to those previously made before 
the trial court.44 In its opinion, the appellate court reversed and 
remanded the trial court decision, holding that although Wallace had 
probable cause to seize Juno, the blood draw was a “physical intrusion 
into defendant’s property” and “the testing of blood ‘revealed 
evidence that was not otherwise exposed to public view’ or to those 
who had lawful access to the dog while it was in the state’s custody.”45 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(describing the test for a person’s constitutional reasonable expectation of privacy in personal 
property). 
 39. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 437 n.4. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 438. 
 42. Id. 
 43. State v. Newcomb, 324 P.3d 557, 559 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). 
 44. Id. at 561. 
 45. Id. at 565–66 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 898 P.2d 193, 195 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)). 
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The search did not fall within any viable warrant exception and it 
therefore was deemed unlawful.46 
The State petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court of Oregon 
focused on one issue: whether there was a protected privacy interest 
in Juno’s blood.47 If found to be a search, the parties disputed the 
reasonableness of the blood draw without a warrant or a warrant 
exception.48 In an opinion drafted by Justice Linder for the eight 
participating justices, the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed and held 
the blood draw was not a search and reinstated the trial court 
decision.49 
III.  REASONING OF THE NEWCOMB COURT 
The Oregon Supreme Court broke its analysis into two portions.50 
The first portion considered whether the blood draw was a search 
under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, and the second 
portion under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.51 The court adhered to a “first-things-first”52 approach in 
reviewing both claims, stating it need not evaluate the Fourth 
Amendment claim unless it first concluded no state violation 
occurred.53 Relying on precedent case State v. Bailey,54 the court 
proceeded under a standard of review viewing the facts “in the light 
most favorable to the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.”55 
A.  Whether a Dog Owner Has a Protected Privacy Interest in the 
Dog’s Blood Under Oregon Constitution Article I, Section 9 
Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution states: “No law 
shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure.”56 
To define terms such as “search,” seizure,” and “interests” under this 
 
 46. Id. at 567. 
 47. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 438–39 (reaching the Supreme Court of Oregon, Newcomb 
conceded the issue of Juno’s lawful seizure). 
 48. Id. at 439. 
 49. Id. at 446. 
 50. Id. at 439–46. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981) (en banc). 
 53. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 439. 
 54. 338 P.3d 702, 704 (Or. 2014). 
 55. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 436. 
 56. OR. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
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section, the court looked to precedent cases.57 A “search” does not 
“occur[] unless the police invade a protected privacy interest.”58 State 
v. Owens59 provides that a “seizure” occurs only where a 
governmental action significantly interferes “with a person’s 
possessory or ownership interests in property.”60 In Newcomb, both 
privacy and ownership or possession interests were in question, with 
possessory rights having an impact on a protected property interest.61 
Finally, the Newcomb court summarized the precedent set in State v. 
Campbell62 that the protected interest “is not the privacy to which [a 
person] expects, but the privacy to which one has a right.”63 
Courts often address the legality of an examination of an item, or 
search, after a warrantless seizure, commonly relating to searches of 
inanimate objects like stereos or folders; however, Juno is a living 
creature.64 The outcome of the legal analysis turns on the importance 
the court places on this one fact.65 
Following the reasoning of her previous arguments, Newcomb 
argued Juno was “personal property,” which she contended should be 
analogous to a “closed opaque container, one that did not announce its 
contents.”66 Under this analysis, Newcomb argued the blood draw 
constituted a search, which would have required Wallace to first 
obtain a warrant.67 Further, Newcomb argued, after a lawful seizure of 
an object such as a stereo or folder, the state may “thoroughly examine 
the exterior,” but that any investigation of the interior is “another 
matter.”68 Without a warrant, the state may only “observe, feel, smell, 
shake, and weigh” the item and make any reasonable observations that 
are in plain view.69 Had the court adopted the approach that Juno was 
 
 57. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 439. 
 58. State v. Wacker, 856 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Or. 1993). Defendant Wacker attempted to suppress 
evidence of a controlled substance, which officers collected pursuant to a search of a vehicle in 
which Wacker was a passenger. See id. at 1031–32. The Supreme Court of Oregon held no search 
occurred because police had not invaded Wacker’s protected privacy interest. See id. at 1036. 
 59. 729 P.2d 524 (Or. 1986). 
 60. Id. at 531. 
 61. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 439; see also State v. Howard, 157 P.3d 1189, 1193 (Or. 2007). 
 62. 759 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Or. 1988). 
 63. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 439 (quoting Campbell, 759 P.2d at 1044). 
 64. Id. at 439. 
 65. See id. at 439, 441–42. 
 66. Id. at 440; OR. REV. STAT. § 609.020 (2009) (“Dogs are hereby declared to be personal 
property.”). 
 67. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 440. 
 68. Id.; State v. Owens, 729 P.2d 524, 530 (Or. 1986). 
 69. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 439–40; State v. Heckathorne, 223 P.3d 1034, 1040–41 (Or. 2009). 
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like any other inanimate piece of personal property, Newcomb would 
have succeeded on this claim.70 
However, at this point, the court’s analysis took a dramatic turn. 
The court referenced State v. Owens, which recognized under Article 
I, section 9 that not all containers are the same, nor do they all receive 
the same protection.71 It further broadened this concept to all personal 
property.72 Based on this precedent, the court’s analysis turned first to 
the nature of the property involved in the case, meaning the nature of 
Juno as a living creature, and second, the circumstances surrounding 
the alleged intrusion of Newcomb’s interests.73 
1.  The Nature of the Property Involved 
In evaluating this first step of the analysis, the court relied on a 
set of cases, State v. Dicke74 and State v. Fessenden,75 later 
consolidated and referred to as Fessenden/Dicke. These cases 
challenged the ability of an officer to enter a property and seize an 
emaciated horse owned by the two codefendants.76 After the seizure, 
the officer took the horse to a veterinarian’s office because he believed 
there was probable cause the defendants were committing first-degree 
animal neglect.77 The officer based probable cause on the following 
observations of the animal: there was no present fatty tissue, a 
protruding backbone, withers that stuck up, a thin neck, visibility of 
all the horse’s ribs, the swaying of the animal on her feet, and that she 
was straining to urinate.78 The officer feared due to the horse’s poor 
condition, if he left and took time away to obtain a warrant the horse 
could fall, which many times would prove fatal.79 Given the gravity of 
the circumstances, the court stated the existing exigent circumstances 
doctrine applied to animal neglect as a crime, but did not actually 
 
 70. Newcomb, 375 P.3d. at 439–40. 
 71. See Owens, 729 P.2d at 530–31 (describing the nature and character of different containers 
such as transparent versus non-transparent containers and that some containers by nature announce 
their contents where others do not). 
 72. Newcomb, 375 P.3d. at 440. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 310 P.3d 1170 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). 
 75. 333 P.3d 278 (Or. 2014). 
 76. Dicke, 310 P.3d at 1170; see Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 278. 
 77. Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 279–80. 
 78. Id. at 280. 
 79. Id. 
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“expand” the doctrine.80 Because the officer had probable cause and 
the horse needed immediate veterinary care, he did not need a warrant 
to seize the animal for treatment.81 
The Newcomb court then evaluated the nature of animals under 
Oregon’s statutes that consider animals as “property.”82 Apart from a 
few exceptions, the statutes allow ownership of animals by 
individuals, a point Newcomb relied upon in her defense.83 However, 
Newcomb failed to address the impact of additional animal welfare 
statutes under Oregon law.84 These welfare statutes provide unique 
and heightened protections for animals.85 The court specifically noted 
that the Oregon protections are some of the highest in the country, 
requiring owners provide at least “minimum care” to their animals.86 
Minimum care is “care sufficient to preserve the health and well-
being of an animal,” including basic nutrition and “veterinary care 
[that a] reasonably prudent person [would deem necessary] to relieve 
distress from injury, neglect, or disease.”87 The legislative purpose for 
creating such protections acknowledge legal and social norms that 
“animals are sentient beings capable of experiencing pain, stress, or 
fear.”88 Bearing this and the nature of animals in mind versus other 
property, the court made a crucial statement that Oregon law prohibits 
people from treating their companion animals as they are free to treat 
other forms of insentient property, which created a higher burden of 
care for owners.89 
 
 80. Id. at 286; see also Exigent-Circumstances, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining one of many exceptions to the warrant requirement, typically where an officer may 
perform a search of property absent a warrant if a person’s life of safety is in danger). 
 81. Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 286. 
 82. OR. REV. STAT. § 609.020 (2009); State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434, 440 (Or. 2016). 
 83. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 440. 
 84. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.325(2), 167.330 (2017) (describing the animal neglect statutes 
for first and second degree); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.310 (2017) (defining the terms related to the 
minimum care requirements); and OR. REV. STAT. § 167.305 (2017) (providing the legislative 
findings that animals are sentient beings that require minimum care to minimize pain, stress, fear, 
and suffering). 
 85. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 440. 
 86. Id. at 441. 
 87. Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 167.310. 
 88. OR. REV. STAT. § 167.305(1). 
 89. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 441. 
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2.  The Circumstances Surrounding the Government’s Alleged 
Intrusion of Newcomb’s Interests 
Ultimately, the court concluded that, like the officer in 
Fessenden/Dicke, Wallace had reason to believe that Juno was 
malnourished, starving, and in need of immediate veterinary care.90 
Wallace based his beliefs on the citizen report of neglect, the owner’s 
admission she did not have money to buy the dog’s food, and the 
officer’s own observations of Juno’s behavior and physical 
appearance.91 These visual observations were similar to the officer’s 
observations in Fessenden/Dicke.92 The officer in Fessenden/Dicke 
observed severe physical conditions of the horse’s neck, ribs, and 
withers, and believed the neglect to be ongoing; the court held the 
animal may be seized without a warrant to prevent ongoing harm and 
for medical treatment.93 Similarly here, Juno was near emaciated, dry 
heaving, and attempting to eat random items in the yard.94 Critically, 
once in the State’s lawful custody based on neglect, an owner loses (at 
least temporarily) the property right interests of dominion and control 
over the animal.95 Therefore, in Newcomb, because the officer had 
probable cause to believe there was ongoing neglect, Newcomb at 
least temporarily lost her property rights in Juno.96 The blood draw 
being necessary to diagnose the animal for treatment to prevent further 
harm made the search of Juno lawful.97 
Tying together concepts of Oregon’s statutes, legislative 
background and purpose, legal and social norms, and given the facts 
of the Newcomb case, the court concluded Juno was not an “opaque 
inanimate container.”98 Therefore, Newcomb did not have a protected 
privacy interest in Juno’s “contents,” like the blood that was drawn.99 
Though Newcomb argued that there was information in Juno that she 
had not knowingly exposed to the public, the court held this is not 
“information” in the sense that Newcomb had placed it inside Juno to 
 
 90. Id. at 442. 
 91. Id. at 437. 
 92. Id. at 436–37. 
 93. State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278, 279–80 (Or. 2014). 
 94. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 436. 
 95. Id. at 443. 
 96. Id. at 442. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 442. 
 99. Id. at 442–43. 
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keep it out of view.100 Consequently, the blood, organs, tissues, and 
bones were all part and product of “physiological processes” taking 
place inside Juno, and as such, were not items Newcomb could have 
placed for some kind of safekeeping.101 
Ultimately, no violation of Newcomb’s rights occurred under 
Oregon Constitution Article I, section 9 because Juno had been legally 
seized based on probable cause of neglect and taken for medical 
diagnosis and treatment.102 In a strong holding, the court emphasized 
that live animals are subject to statutory protection and that an owner 
has “no cognizable right, in the name of her privacy to countermand 
that obligation.”103 The narrow holding is applicable only in situations 
where the animal has been seized lawfully, and then taken for medical 
diagnosis or treatment.104 
B.  Whether a Dog Owner Has a Protected Privacy Interest in the 
Dog’s Blood Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution 
The court next turned to a brief analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment, which guarantees similar protections to the Oregon 
Constitution.105 Comparably, the Fourth Amendment protects “the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”106 The term 
“search” is defined as an infringement of an individual’s protected 
privacy interest, and “seizure” as a “meaningful interference with a 
person’s possessory interest.”107 
The analysis rests on a two-part test, as articulated by Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States.108 To satisfy the first 
 
 100. Id. at 443 & n.13 (discussing the ability of animals to store information). This discussion 
is not applicable to the instant case, and therefore is outside the scope of this Comment. Interesting 
to note, the court makes mention of developing technology and microchipping techniques that may 
present a more pressing issue in the near future. 
 101. Id. at 443. 
 102. Id. at 446. 
 103. Id. at 443 (explaining that although the privacy test under the Oregon Constitution seems 
like a different analysis than the Fourth Amendment test, the two tests commonly lead to the same 
result). 
 104. Id. at 444 (suggesting that there is continuous development in understanding how all living 
things work together, and for that reason, the legal status of animals continues to change). 
 105. Id. 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 444. 
 107. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 439. 
 108. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
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prong, Newcomb would have to display a subjective expectation of 
privacy to preserve the contents of Juno as private.109 To fulfill the 
second prong, Newcomb would have to demonstrate that this 
expectation is objectively one which “society is prepared to recognize 
as reasonable.”110 
The issue under the Fourth Amendment boiled down to the same 
question as under the Oregon Constitution: whether Newcomb had a 
protected privacy interest in Juno’s blood, which was withdrawn after 
a lawful seizure based on probable cause of neglect for the purposes 
of medical diagnosis and treatment.111 Newcomb argued the property 
analysis under Florida v. Jardines112 was controlling. In Jardines, 
officers used a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch and curtilage of 
Jardines’ property, which amounted to a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.113 Newcomb argued the blood draw was a similar 
physical intrusion on her property as the drug-sniffing dog was in 
Jardines.114 However, the court quickly dismissed the Jardines 
argument because it dealt with “physical invasions of property that the 
government had not lawfully seized.”115 Because the court had already 
settled that Juno had been lawfully seized, it felt no need to explore 
this argument further.116 
At the time of Newcomb, the United States Supreme Court had 
not yet heard a case regarding privacy interests in animals. However, 
the Oregon Supreme Court felt confident a United States Supreme 
Court decision would not differ much from its analysis under Article 
I, section 9.117 The Oregon court began the property analysis under the 
Fourth Amendment by considering the “differing nature” of the 
property here, as a living animal and not a type of “closed opaque 
container” that would lead to an expectation of privacy.118 The next 
consideration includes a necessary examination of the nature and 
circumstances of the government intrusion, as well as the general laws 
and social norms in regards to animal welfare, to determine what 
 
 109. Id.; Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 444. 
 110. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 444; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 111. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 445. 
 112. 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
 113. Id. at 11–12. 
 114. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 445 n.17. 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 446. 
 117. Id. at 445. 
 118. Id. 
(9)51.4_SIMERS (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019  10:08 AM 
2018] COMPANION ANIMALS ARE MORE THAN PROPERTY 765 
society is willing to recognize as a legitimate interest.119 For all of the 
reasons previously mentioned, the court concluded the same: no 
violation under the Fourth Amendment occurred because the 
defendant had no protected privacy interest in Juno’s blood.120 
IV.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Protected Privacy Interests and Ownership/Possession 
The development of significant criminal procedure, property 
interests, and Fourth Amendment rights discussions in the United 
States dates back as far as 1886, in Boyd v. United States.121 Boyd was 
a customs and revenue case based on the Fourth & Fifth 
Amendments.122 The holding in Boyd discussed how a forced turnover 
of personal property such as invoices would implicate the Fourth 
Amendment as an unreasonable search and seizure, because Boyd 
retained the superior property interest in his documents.123 A state’s 
power to search and seize depends on who retains this superior 
interest. A state, under Boyd’s property analysis, can only search or 
seize if it is entitled to do so, for example, in the case of credit 
default.124 Boyd is significant in Newcomb because it lays a 
foundational framework of the property analysis the Newcomb court 
maintained should have been extended to animals.125 
The key progression of Fourth Amendment analysis began in the 
1960s with the Cleveland case, Mapp v. Ohio.126 In Mapp, the 
Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule 
applied to both state and federal cases, giving the Fourth Amendment 
“teeth.”127 The exclusionary rule “excludes or suppresses evidence 
obtained in violation of an accused person’s constitutional rights.”128 
Created by the courts, the exclusionary rule acts as a remedy for the 
 
 119. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995); Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 445–
46; see Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013). 
 120. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 446. 
 121. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 122. Id. at 621. 
 123. Id. at 624. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 445; see generally Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616 (1886) (providing in 
detail the earliest property analysis under the Fourth Amendment). 
 126. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 127. RONALD JAY ALLEN, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 321 (3d ed. 2016). 
 128. Exclusionary Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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defendant whose rights are violated, and acts to deter law enforcement 
from conducting searches and seizures that violate the Fourth 
Amendment.129 Mapp is relevant to Newcomb because Newcomb was 
seeking to use this Fourth Amendment remedy of the exclusionary rule 
in her motion to suppress before trial.130 If she had been successful, it 
would have barred the use of Juno’s test results at trial, making a 
conviction less likely. 
In 1966, shortly after Mapp, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Schmerber v. California,131 where a police officer responding 
to a car accident had probable cause to believe the driver responsible 
for the accident was under the influence and subsequently forced him 
to submit to a blood test.132 The Court held that a blood draw of a 
person falls within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, but is 
considered reasonable so long as the officer has probable cause, 
reasonable belief an emergency exists, and the procedure for the blood 
draw was medically reasonable.133 In Schmerber, the emergency was 
such that in the time it would take to secure a warrant, the alcohol in 
the defendant’s system could dissipate, destroying evidence before the 
completion of any testing.134 This creates an exigency, and under the 
exigent circumstances in Schmerber, the officer did not have to obtain 
a warrant for the blood draw.135 The exigent circumstances doctrine 
will sometimes “justify a warrantless search or seizure, esp[ecially] 
when there is probable cause to believe that evidence will be removed 
or destroyed before a warrant can be obtained.”136 It is a type of 
emergency, requiring “immediate action” on the part of the officer for 
any of the accepted reasons.137 Schmerber is a relevant piece of the 
historical framework because it creates the exigent circumstances 
doctrine that the Oregon Supreme Court later applied in 
Fessenden/Dicke, as discussed in Newcomb.138 
 
 129. Exclusionary Rule, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exclusionary_rule (last updated June 2017). 
 130. See Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 437–38. 
 131. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 132. Id. at 758. 
 133. Id. at 768–72. 
 134. Id. at 770. 
 135. Id. at 771. 
 136. Exigent-Circumstances Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 137. Exigency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 138. Compare State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434, 440 (Or. 2016), with State v. Fessenden, 333 
P.3d 278, 282 (Or. 2014), and Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757 (explaining in Schmerber the exigent 
circumstances doctrine as applied in an analysis of the Fourth Amendment). While the court in 
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The Newcomb court relied on Justice Harlan’s concurrence and 
two-prong test from Katz139 as described in United States v. Knotts,140 
making the two cases historically significant here.141 In Knotts, the 
government, with permission of the original owner, placed a beeper 
into a barrel of chemicals, which the defendant subsequently 
bought.142 The beeper, along with visual surveillance, allowed the 
government to track the defendant to a cabin.143 After several days of 
visual observation, the police were able to obtain a warrant to search 
the cabin, finding a fully developed drug lab inside.144 The Court 
applied the two-prong Katz test, using both its objective and subjective 
components.145 The first, subjective prong provides whether a person 
has manifested a subjective expectation to preserve something as 
private. The second, objective prong provides whether the individual’s 
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.”146 The beeper did not invade any reasonable 
expectation of privacy, because Knotts had no expectation of privacy 
in the barrel nor in the movement of his car on public roads.147 The 
Court subsequently held there was no Fourth Amendment violation.148 
Finally, turning to the issue of opaque containers under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Newcomb court cited various United States Supreme 
Court cases, including California v. Acevedo149 and United States v. 
Ross.150 These cases discuss the following issue: when an individual 
puts information or items into a closed, opaque container, does he or 
she manifest an expectation of privacy in the contents of such 
 
Fessenden allowed for the exigent circumstances doctrine to be used, it was in a slightly different 
way than that illustrated in Schmerber. The Fessenden court allowed for its usage in the animal 
abuse case, and it was careful not to extend the doctrine. 
 139. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
 140. 460 U.S. 276, 280–81 (1983). 
 141. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280–81; Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 444; see also United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (relying on analysis from Knotts and Katz). 
 142. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 279. 
 145. See id. at 280–81. 
 146. Id. at 281. 
 147. See id. at 282. 
 148. Id. at 285. 
 149. 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 150. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
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containers remaining hidden from the public?151 Newcomb’s defense 
relied in part on this argument; she argued that she had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in Juno’s blood and an expectation for it to 
remain out of public view and examination.152 However, Newcomb 
failed under the second prong because these expectations were not one 
society was ready to accept as reasonable under these specific 
circumstances.153 
B.  Oregon Decisions Leading up to Newcomb 
The Newcomb court relied on a few cases in establishing the 
interpretation and application of Article I, section 9.154 The most 
notable is the predecessor to the Newcomb case, Fessenden/Dicke, as 
discussed supra.155 The decision in that case upheld the ability of an 
officer to seize a horse for immediate medical care based on probable 
cause and under exigent circumstances.156 The Newcomb court relied 
heavily on this case in its analysis as the issues were closely related.157 
Newcomb became next in a line of Oregon decisions over the last few 
years to increase protections for animals.158 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Given the rise of animal rights in recent decades and the historical 
framework of the Fourth Amendment, the Oregon Supreme Court 
correctly held that Juno’s blood draw was not a search. Juno is not a 
mere container, but a living creature.159 This distinction critically 
impacts the privacy interests of the owner in a criminal procedure 
context.160 This follows the trend and social norms that place animals 
in a more elevated position under the law than other pieces of personal 
 
 151. Id.; see generally California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (describing in more detail 
the current and relevant law in relation to a person’s expectation of privacy when she places 
information or items in closed opaque containers). 
 152. State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434, 438 (Or. 2016). 
 153. Id. at 446. 
 154. Id. at 439. 
 155. State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278 (Or. 2014). 
 156. Id. at 286. 
 157. See State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434 (Or. 2016). 
 158. Green, supra note 14 (omitting the discussion of State v. Nix, 334 P.3d 437 (Or. 2014) 
which, while relevant to the discussion, the Nix decision was later vacated by the Oregon Supreme 
Court based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 159. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 442–43. 
 160. Id. 
(9)51.4_SIMERS (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019  10:08 AM 
2018] COMPANION ANIMALS ARE MORE THAN PROPERTY 769 
property.161 It makes it easier for veterinarians to treat lawfully seized 
animals immediately for illness or injury without wasting potentially 
precious moments waiting on a warrant.162 In so ruling, the court gave 
legal significance to the “sentient nature of animals,” which as 
previously noted, historically were regarded only as “mere property” 
under the law.163 
Turning to the property analysis, the court first determined that 
under Oregon law, dogs are personal property, allowing them to be 
owned and possessed.164 Under the Oregon animal welfare statutes, 
however, because the animal had been lawfully seized based on 
probable cause for neglect, the court determined that at the time of the 
blood draw that Newcomb had lost—at least temporarily—her 
property or possessory interest in Juno.165 Drawing on and applying 
the other foundational consolidated case of Fessenden/Dicke, this 
emphasizes the growing trend to move away from a strict property 
interpretation of animals under the law. 
Advocates at the Animal League Defense Fund (“ALDF”) 
submitted amicus curiae briefs in these significant Oregon cases 
(Newcomb and Fessenden/Dicke).166 The ALDF is a nationwide 
nonprofit organization of attorneys specializing in animal 
protection.167 The ALDF, as advocated for in their numerous briefs, 
hopes courts will go one-step further, by also creating an established 
emergency aid exception under Article I, section 9 or under the Fourth 
Amendment in these types of animal welfare cases.168 
 
 161. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(5) (2017) (guiding court decisions in divorce cases by 
basing custody on the best interests of the animal); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.305(2) (2017); 
Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 286; cf. Krimmer, supra note 12 (suggesting a Wisconsin pet custody statute 
closely modeled on Alaska’s law); California Court of Appeals Says Pets Are More than Inanimate 
Property, supra note 12 (discussing the California Second District Court of Appeals ruling that 
allows for reasonable recovery of necessary costs for wrongfully injured animals); “Goddard’s 
Law” Passes Ohio House, supra note 12 (discussing now-enacted “Goddard’s Law,” which 
elevates penalties for animal abuse to felonies). 
 162. Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 286 (Or. 2014). 
 163. See Green, supra note 14. 
 164. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 609.020 (2009); Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 440. 
 165. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.310 (2017); Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 441–42. 
 166. Brief of Amicus Curiae, State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278 (Or. 2014) (Nos. 
S061740, S061770), 2014 WL 1571694; Brief of Amicus Curaie, State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434 
(Or. 2016) (No. S062387), 2014 WL 5910792. 
 167. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 1, State v. Fessenden, 333 P.3d 278 (Or. 2014) (Nos. 
S061740, S061770), 2014 WL 1571694 at *1. 
 168. Arin Greenwood, Oregon Court Says Animals Can Be Crime ‘Victims,’ Like People. So 
What Does That Mean?, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2014, 11:12 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/26/oregon-court-animals-victims_n_5883588.html. 
(9)51.4_SIMERS (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019  10:08 AM 
770 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:753 
Even though the Newcomb case is the first in Oregon to clearly 
state dogs are not “mere property,” the idea behind the decision is far 
from original.169 Various states including California, Ohio, Alaska, 
and Wisconsin either have already, or are in the process of, making 
the same determination as Oregon, whether through their judicial or 
legislative processes.170 
California 
In 2012, the California Court of Appeals decided a set of 
consolidated cases in Martinez v. Robledo.171 The two cases dealt with 
separate instances where pets had been wrongfully harmed, and the 
parties were seeking to recover damages.172 Previously, owners in this 
situation could recover only the fair market value of the animal, much 
like any other personal property damage, like to a sofa.173 
Nevertheless, California’s Second District Court of Appeal held that 
the owner of a wrongfully injured pet may recover “the reasonable and 
necessary costs” of treating and caring for an injured animal.174 It 
encapsulated the idea that every animal is unique and that a majority 
of people would go to great lengths to care and provide for their 
animals.175 Similar to Oregon statutes, California statutes have long 
recognized that: “Animals are special, sentient beings, because unlike 
 
 169. Newcomb, 375 P.3d at 434, 440. 
 170. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(5) (2017) (guiding court decisions in divorce cases by 
basing custody on the best interests of the animal); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.305(2) (2017);  
Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 286; cf. Krimmer, supra note 12 (suggesting a Wisconsin pet custody statute 
closely modeled on Alaska’s law); California Court of Appeals Says Pets Are More than Inanimate 
Property, supra note 12 (discussing the California Second District Court of Appeals ruling that 
allows for reasonable recovery of necessary costs for wrongfully injured animals); “Goddard’s 
Law” Passes Ohio House, supra note 12 (discussing now-enacted “Goddard’s Law,” which 
elevates penalties for animal abuse to felonies). 
 171. 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 172. Id. at 922–23. The parties and facts of the two consolidated cases were unrelated. In the 
first case, the Martinez’s dog Gunner, who was a two-year-old German Shepherd, got loose in a 
neighbor’s yard. The families were not on good terms, and the neighbor, Enrique Robledo, shot 
Gunner, resulting in the amputation of his right rear leg. The Martinez family sought recovery of 
veterinarian bills and punitive damages under negligence and conversion doctrines. In the second 
case , owner Margaret Workman took her nine-year-old Golden Retriever, Katie, to a small animal 
hospital for surgery. During the surgery, Dr. Klause nicked and cut Katie’s intestine causing 
internal bleeding and left a piece of surgical gauze inside her body and did not tell Workman what 
happened. When Katie became increasingly more sick, Workman took her for emergency surgery 
to correct the problems and remove the gauze. Workman sued Dr. Klause for negligence and unfair 
business practices. 
 173. Id. at 924. 
 174. Id. at 927. 
 175. Id. at 926. 
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other forms of property, animals feel pain, suffer, and die.”176 
Although the California statutes focus on remedies for wrongful injury 
or death—a more tort-based claim—and the Oregon statute focuses 
more on a Fourth Amendment claim, both seem to arrive at the same 
conclusion: animals are sentient beings and therefore require more 
under the law than other forms of personal property.177 
Ohio 
In 2016, Ohio passed new legislation known as “Goddard’s 
Law.”178 Named after Dick Goddard, the longtime Ohio weather 
personality and animal protection activist, House Bill 60 made it a 
fifth-degree felony to “knowingly cause serious physical harm to a 
companion animal.”179 
Included in this is the infliction of ongoing pain and suffering, 
food and water deprivation, or any activity that involves a substantial 
risk of death or incapacity of the animal.180 The punishment includes 
mandatory jail time, as well as a considerable fine.181 Though 
Goddard’s Law made huge steps forward in animal protection, it only 
covers those cases where a person knowingly causes harm, reserving 
its use for only “the most egregious animal cruelty offenders.”182 
Ohio’s Goddard’s Law and Oregon’s welfare statutes involve 
substantially similar “minimum care” standards.183 Oregon requires 
owners to provide minimum care such as food and water, whereas 
Ohio makes it a felony to knowingly cause harm through the 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. See State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434 (Or. 2016); Martinez, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921. 
 178. Darcie Loreno, Goddard’s Law Goes into Effect Today in Ohio, FOX 8 CLEVELAND 
(Sept. 13, 2016, 7:07 AM), https://fox8.com/2016/09/13/goddards-law-goes-into-effect-today-in-
ohio/. 
 179. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.131(C) (West 2016); Jonathan Tressler, 2016 Legislation 
Gives State, Local Animal Protection Laws More Bite, NEWS-HERALD (Jan. 2, 2017, 7:35 PM), 
http://www.news-herald.com/general-news/20170102/2016-legislation-gives-state-local-animal-
protection-laws-more-bite. 
 180. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.131(E)(2); Penny Eims, New Law in Ohio Makes Animal 
Cruelty a Felony, SHELTERME.TV, https://shelterme.tv/news/new-law-in-ohio-makes-animal-
cruelty-a-felony/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 181. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.99(E)(2); Eims, supra note 180. 
 182. Tressler, supra note 179. The application of the new law refers only to companion animals 
such as dogs and cats and does not extend to livestock. Id. It is also a common misunderstanding 
that Goddard’s Law applies to all animal cruelty cases and is therefore too harsh. In fact, it does 
not apply to every instance of neglect or cruelty, but rather, is reserved only for the most serious 
cases. 
 183. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.131(E)(2); OR. REV. STAT.  § 167.310(9) (2017). 
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deprivation of these items.184 The Oregon welfare statute proactively 
encourages owners to provide such necessities, where in contrast, 
Goddard’s Law seeks to deter the behavior by retroactively increasing 
punishment for those who fail to abide by its provisions.185 
Nevertheless, the goal of the Ohio, Oregon, and California statutes and 
judicial decisions endeavor to provide the same thing: greater 
protection under the law for animals.186 
Alaska 
In a slight shift, yet still relevant to the discussion, Alaska revised 
a common divorce statute in early 2017 to consider the “well-being” 
of animals in divorce proceedings.187 The provision is the first of its 
kind in the United States.188 Divorce proceedings, similar to the other 
aforementioned types of cases, have historically viewed animals as 
property that become part of the “property distribution” when a couple 
gets divorced.189 Similar to Ohio’s Goddard’s Law, Alaska’s revised 
divorce statue applies to companion animals only and bases custodial 
decisions on what is best for the animal, not just the interests of its 
owners.190 Existing legislation of this nature is typically reserved for 
children, although Alaska made clear that the new legislation would 
not put animals on par with humans.191 However, this area of family 
law in Alaska elevates companion animals over the historical property 
interest, and acknowledges the same social trend noted in Newcomb: 
animals are increasingly regarded as part of the family.192 
 
 184. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.99(E)(4); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.330. 
 185. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.99(E)(4); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.330. 
 186. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.131; OR. REV. STAT. § 167.310(9); Martinez v. 
Robledo, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921, 926–27 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 187. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (2017). 
 188. Debra Cassens Weiss, Alaska Law Tells Divorce Judges to Consider Well-Being of Pets, 
ABA J. (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:26 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/alaska_law_tells_ 
divorce_judges_to_consider_well_being_of_pets. 
 189. Karin Brulliard, In a First, Alaska Divorce Courts Will Now Treat Pets More Like 
Children, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/animalia/wp/2017 
/01/24/in-a-first-alaska-divorce-courts-will-now-treat-pets-more-like-
children/?utm_term=.63e6ceffdbb3; see also Marital Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014) (defining marital property as “property that is acquired during marriage and that is subject 
to distribution or division at the time of marital dissolution” and the rough equivalent to community 
property). 
 190. Brulliard, supra note 189. 
 191. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.590 (defining “pet” as “a vertebrate living creature maintained 
for companionship or pleasure”). 
 192. See Brulliard, supra note 189. 
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This new legislation is “groundbreaking” and “unique,” and is 
projected to evolve in states nationwide.193 Once again, the similarities 
are consistent and notable here. Legislators are recognizing the 
continued personal property application of the law to animals to be 
inadequate due to animals’ sentient nature.194 With this in mind, the 
law differentiates between companion animals and other divisions of 
personal property in divorce proceedings but does not propose to 
elevate them to the same level as humans.195 
Wisconsin 
Following Alaska’s example, Wisconsin proposed a bill in late 
2017 outlining how courts should handle pet custody battles in divorce 
cases.196 While acknowledging the traditional approach of treating 
animals the same as other items of personal property,197 legislators 
also recognized that some items of personal property may hold 
sentimental value such as antiques passed down through generations, 
etc.198 But as one Wisconsin lawmaker firmly stated: “a dog is not a 
desk.”199 
Under the traditional property view, the individual who can 
establish ownership of the animal would retain custody of it.200 This 
Wisconsin bill proposes to allow “couples [to] specify, among other 
things, visitation rights and the right to move the animal out of 
state.”201 Once again, the legislation captures the increasing value of 
animals as family members, noting that the value far surpasses any 
other form of tangible personal property.202 
The analysis of these states’ progressive legislation and the 
judicial decisions over the last few years, from neglect and abuse cases 
to divorce proceedings, provide a small glimpse at the overwhelming 
trend to move to higher protection for the well-being of animals. The 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Suzanne Monyak, When the Law Recognizes Animals as People, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/146870/law-recognizes-animals-people. 
 195. Brulliard, supra note 189; Weiss, supra note 188. 
 196. P.J. Huffstutter, Wisconsin Bill Outlines Rules for Pet Custody, SEATTLE TIMES 
(July 15, 2007, 2:03 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/wisconsin-bill-outlines-
rules-for-pet-custody/. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. (quoting Senator Carol Roessler, co-author of the bill). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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Newcomb court falls in line with this trend. As the court stated, “we 
do not need a mirror to the past or a telescope to the future to recognize 
the legal status of animals has changed and is changing still.”203 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The development of animal rights and protections began in 1641 
in the United States and continues to evolve over time.204 The 
substantial conclusion by the court in Newcomb continues to propel 
the matter forward, as numerous states across the country have also 
begun looking at harsher punishments for neglect and abuse, remedies 
for wrongful injury to animals, and the general best interests of 
animals.205 It is clear given these facts, that as time progresses more 
protections for the well-being of animals are in the works. The 
Newcomb court carefully pointed out that they did not place animals 
on par with humans.206 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged the 
analogy used by the trial court that the case closely resembled “the 
medical examination and diagnostic analysis of a child taken into 
protective custody on suspicion of abuse.”207 This significantly 
elevates animals from the position of property such as suitcases and 
recognizes their sentient nature.208 When mistreated, animals 
experience feelings of pain, stress, and fear.209 Much like a child, 
animals are unable to seek help or speak for themselves, warranting 
higher protections under the law.210 This evolving legal standard of 
 
 203. State v. Newcomb, 375 P.3d 434, 444 (Or. 2016). 
 204. Janet M. Davis, The History of Animal Protection in the United States, ORG. AM. 
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“Goddard’s Law,” which elevates penalties for animal abuse to felonies). 
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animals as “mere property,” as evaluated in Newcomb remains one of 
the top animal rights issues in the United States.211 
The court’s decision in Newcomb encompasses the growing 
social norm that many consider their animals as part of the family.212 
As the Newcomb court stated: “A person can be as cruel or abusive as 
she wants to her own stereo or folder and can neglect the maintenance 
of a car to the point it will not operate, without legal consequence. The 
same is not true of an animal that a person owns or has custody 
over.”213 Further, “some animals, such as pets, occupy a unique 
position in people’s hearts and in the law, one that is not well-reflected 
in the ‘cold characterization’ of a dog as ‘mere property.’”214 
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